The XEdDSA and VXEdDSA Signature Schemes
Revision 1, 2016-10-20 [PDF]
Trevor Perrin (editor)
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Preliminaries
- 3. XEdDSA
- 4. VXEdDSA
- 5. Curve25519
- 6. Curve448
- 7. Performance considerations
- 8. Security considerations
- 9. IPR
- 10. Acknowledgements
- 11. References
This document describes how to create and verify EdDSA-compatible signatures using public key and private key formats initially defined for the X25519 and X448 elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman functions (–). We refer to this as the "XEdDSA" signature scheme (or "XEd25519" or "XEd448" for specific curves).
XEdDSA enables use of a single key pair format for both elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman and signatures. In some situations it enables using the same key pair for both algorithms.
This document also describes "VXEdDSA" which extends XEdDSA to make it a verifiable random function, or VRF (as defined in  and ). Successful verification of a VXEdDSA signature returns a VRF output which is guaranteed to be unique for the message and public key. The VRF output for a given message and public key is indistinguishable from random to anyone who has not seen a VXEdDSA signature for that message and key.
Multiplication of integers a and b modulo prime p is ab (mod p), or a * b (mod p). Division is a/b (mod p) and is calculated as ab-1 (mod p). We define inv(a) (mod p) to return a-1 (mod p) when a is not 0, and return 0 when a is 0. This may be calculated as inv(a) = ap-2 (mod p), per Fermat . The ceil() and floor() functions round up or down to the nearest integer.
Addition and subtraction of elliptic curve points A and B is A + B and A - B. Scalar multiplication of an integer a with an elliptic curve point B yields a new point C = aB.
Integer variables are in lower case (x, y). Points and other variables are in upper case (P, Q). Integer constants are in lowercase except for the Montgomery curve constant A, which follows convention.
Byte sequences are in bold (x, P). A bold integer or elliptic curve point represents a fixed-length byte sequence encoding the value. See Section 2.4 for encoding and decoding details. The concatenation of byte sequences x and P is x || P.
Checking integers or points for equality is done with a == b. Checking byte sequences X and Y for equality is done with bytes_equal(X, Y).
2.2. Elliptic curve parameters
An elliptic curve used with XEdDSA or VXEdDSDA has the following parameters:
|q||Order of base point (prime; q < p; qB = I)|
|d||Twisted Edwards curve constant|
|A||Montgomery curve constant (see Section 2.6)|
|n||Nonsquare integer modulo p (see Section 2.6)|
|b||8 * ( ceil((|p| + 1)/8) ) (= bitlength for encoded point or integer)|
An integer modulo p is a "field element". An integer modulo q is a "scalar".
An elliptic curve is a set of pairs of field elements. Each pair is a "point", the field elements contained in a point are "coordinates", and the coordinates of each point must satisfy some equation which defines the curve. The on_curve(P) function returns true if a purported point P satisfies the curve equation.
The elliptic curve also defines an addition operation between points, and an operation for negating points. Together with the identity point, these operations define a group structure on the curve's points. Adding a point P to itself k times (P + P + P + ...) is scalar multiplication by the scalar k, represented as kP.
XEdDSA and VXEdDSA are defined for twisted Edwards curves consisting of points denoted (x, y). A twisted Edwards curve is birationally equivalent to some Montgomery curve consisting of points denoted (u, v) . We will mainly deal with the twisted Edwards curve, so when we discuss the base point B and identity point I, we are referring to points on the twisted Edwards curve.
The u_to_y function applies a curve-specific birational map to convert the u-coordinate of a point on the Montgomery curve to the y-coordinate of the equivalent point on the twisted Edwards curve.
2.3. Elliptic curve conversions
Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman is often calculated using the Montgomery ladder. This gives a simple and efficient calculation that is naturally resistant to timing side channels. The Montgomery ladder also allows each party's public key to be a Montgomery u-coordinate. Using a single coordinate instead of the whole point makes public keys smaller without the expense of point decompression.
However, EdDSA signatures are defined on twisted Edwards curves, where a public key is a compressed point consisting of a twisted Edwards y-coordinate and a sign bit s which is either 0 or 1. A twisted Edwards y-coordinate and sign bit provide an alternate representation of a twisted Edwards point, and determine the x-coordinate as specified in  or .
Converting from a Montgomery u-coordinate to a twisted Edwards point P can be done with the convert_mont function, below. This function first masks off excess high bits from u, which is standard practice for Curve25519 Montgomery public keys, and is specified in . The function then applies the curve-specific birational map to compute a twisted Ewards y-coordinate, and finally chooses the sign bit as zero.
umasked = u (mod 2|p|)
P.y = u_to_y(umasked)
P.s = 0
Because convert_mont doesn't have the Montgomery v, it can't distinguish between the two possibilities for the twisted Edwards sign bit. Forcing the sign bit to zero is an idea from Jivsov .
To make private keys compatible with this conversion, we define a twisted Edwards private key as a scalar a where the twisted Edwards public key A = aB has a sign bit of zero (recall that B is the twisted Edwards base point). We allow a Montgomery private key to be any scalar.
Converting a Montgomery private key k to a twisted Edwards public key and private key (A, a) can be done with the calculate_key_pair function ( "A" here is the public key, not the Montgomery curve constant). This function multiplies the Montgomery private key k by the twisted Edwards base point B, then adjusts the private key if necessary to produce a sign bit of zero, following .
E = kB
A.y = E.y
A.s = 0
if E.s == 1:
a = -k (mod q)
a = k (mod q)
return A, a
2.4. Byte sequences
An integer in bold represents a byte sequence of b bits that encodes the integer in little-endian form. An elliptic curve point in bold (e.g. P) encodes P.y as an integer in little-endian form of b-1 bits in length, followed by a bit for P.s.
2.5. Hash functions
XEdDSA and VXEdDSA require a cryptographic hash function. The default hash function is SHA-512 .
We define hash as a function that applies the cryptographic hash to an input byte sequence, and returns an integer which is the output from the cryptographic hash parsed in little-endian form. Given hash and the curve constants p and b, we define a family of hash functions indexed by nonnegative integers i such that 2|p| - 1 - i > p.
return hash(2b - 1 - i || X)
So hash0 hashes b/8 bytes of 0xFF prior to the input byte sequence X, hash1 changes the first byte to 0xFE, hash2 changes the first byte to 0xFD, and so on.
Different hashi will be used for different purposes, to provide cryptographic domain separation. Note that hashi will never call hash with the first b bits encoding a valid scalar or elliptic curve point, since the first |p| bits encode an integer greater than p. Note also that hash0 is reserved for use by other specifications, and is not used in this document.
2.6. Hashing to a point with Elligator 2
VXEdDSA requires mapping an input message to an elliptic curve point, which is done using the Elligator 2 map .
The description in  is terse and uses different notation, so we briefly review Elligator 2. The Montgomery curve equation for points (u, v) is v2 = u(u2 + Au + 1) (mod p), where A is some curve-specific constant. Elligator 2 maps an integer r onto some u for which u(u2 + Au + 1) has a square root v modulo p. The following lemma is used.
Lemma (Bernstein, Hamburg, Krasnova, Lange). If u1 and u2 are integers modulo p such that u2 = -A - u1 and u2/u1 = nr2 for any r and fixed nonsquare n, then the Montgomery curve equation v2 = u(u2 + Au + 1) has a solution for u = u1 or u = u2, or both.
Proof. Given u1 and u2, define w1 = u1(u12 + Au1 + 1) and w2 = u2(u22 + Au2 + 1). We must prove that a solution exists for either v2 = w1 or v2 = w2. We will show that w2/w1 is either zero or nonsquare, which implies either that w2 is zero, which is square, or that one of w2 or w1 is square.
w2/w1 = u2(u22 + Au2 + 1) / u1(u12 + Au1 + 1)
w2/w1 = (u2/u1) (u22 + Au2 + 1) / (u12 + Au1 + 1)
Applying u2 = -A - u1 gives:
w2/w1 = u2/u1
Applying u2/u1 = nr2 gives:
w2/w1 = nr2
If r is zero then w2 must be zero, which is square. If r is nonzero then since r2 is square and n is nonsquare, w2/w1 is nonsquare, which implies one of w2 or w1 is square, so the proof is concluded. ▫
From the lemma it follows that u1 = -A/(1 + nr2) and u2 = -Anr2/(1 + nr2). Thus given r, we can easily calculate u1 and u2 and use the Legendre symbol  to choose whichever value gives a square w. The elligator2 function implements this map from an integer r to an integer u.
u1 = -A * inv(1 + nr2) (mod p)
w1 = u1(u12 + Au1 + 1) (mod p)
if w1(p-1)/2 == -1 (mod p):
u2 = -A - u1 (mod p)
(The inv function is used safely since calling inv(0) when r2 = -1/n will simply map r onto u=0, a valid Montgomery u-coordinate.)
To map a byte sequence onto an Edwards point, we hash the byte sequence and parse the hash output to get a field element r and a sign bit s. Elligator 2 converts r to a Montgomery u-coordinate. The birational map converts the Montgomery u-coordinate to an Edwards point. Finally, we multiply the Edwards point by the cofactor c to ensure it lies within the order q subgroup generated by the base point B. The hash_to_point function implements these steps.
h = hash2(X)
r = h (mod 2|p|)
s = floor((h mod 2b) / 2b-1)
u = elligator2(r)
P.y = u_to_y(u)
P.s = s
The XEdDSA signing algorithm requires the following inputs:
|k||Montgomery private key (integer mod q)|
|M||Message to sign (byte sequence)|
|Z||64 bytes secure random data (byte sequence)|
The output is a signature (R || s), a byte sequence of length 2b bits, where R encodes a point and s encodes an integer modulo q.
The XEdDSA verification algorithm requires the following inputs:
|u||Montgomery public key (byte sequence of b bits)|
|M||Message to verify (byte sequence)|
|R || s||Signature to verify (byte sequence of 2b bits)|
If XEdDSA verification is successful it returns true, otherwise it returns false. Below is the pseudocode for the xeddsa_sign and xeddsa_verify functions.
xeddsa_sign(k, M, Z):
A, a = calculate_key_pair(k)
r = hash1(a || M || Z) (mod q)
R = rB
h = hash(R || A || M) (mod q)
s = r + ha (mod q)
return R || s
xeddsa_verify(u, M, (R || s)):
if u >= p or R.y >= 2|p| or s >= 2|q|:
A = convert_mont(u)
if not on_curve(A):
h = hash(R || A || M) (mod q)
Rcheck = sB - hA
if bytes_equal(R, Rcheck):
The VXEdDSA signing algorithm takes the same inputs as XEdDSA. The output is a pair of values. First, a signature (V || h || s), which is a byte sequence of length 3b bits, where V encodes a point and h and s encode integers modulo q. Second, a VRF output byte sequence v of length equal to b bits, formed by multiplying the V output by the cofactor c.
The VXEdDSA verification algorithm takes the same inputs as XEdDSA, except with a VXEdDSA signature instead of an XEdDSA signature. If VXEdDSA verification is successful, it returns a VRF output byte sequence v of length equal to b bits; otherwise it returns false.
Below is the pseudocode for the vxeddsa_sign and vxeddsa_verify functions.
vxeddsa_sign(k, M, Z):
A, a = calculate_key_pair(k)
Bv = hash_to_point(A || M)
V = aBv
r = hash3(a || V || Z) (mod q)
R = rB
Rv = rBv
h = hash4(A || V || R || Rv || M) (mod q)
s = r + ha (mod q)
v = hash5(cV) (mod 2b)
return (V || h || s), v
vxeddsa_verify(u, M, (V || h || s)):
if u >= p or V.y >= 2|p| or h >= 2|q| or s >= 2|q|:
A = convert_mont(u)
Bv = hash_to_point(A || M)
if not on_curve(A) or not on_curve(V):
if cA == I or cV == I or Bv == I:
R = sB - hA
Rv = sBv - hV
hcheck = hash4(A || V || R || Rv || M) (mod q)
if bytes_equal(h, hcheck):
v = hash5(cV) (mod 2b)
The Curve25519 elliptic curve specified in  can be used with XEdDSA and VXEdDSA, giving XEd25519 and VXEd25519. This curve defines the following parameters.
|p||2255 - 19|
|q||2252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493|
|d||-121665 / 121666 (mod p)|
The twisted Edwards curve equation is -x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2. The u_to_y function implements the birational map from  by calculating y = ( u - 1) * inv( u + 1) (mod p).
XEd25519 signatures are valid Ed25519 signatures  and vice versa, provided the public keys are converted with the birational map.
Ed25519 allows implementations some flexibility in accepting or rejecting certain invalid signatures (e.g. with s unreduced, or checking the verification equation with or without cofactor multiplication). XEdDSA precisely specifies verification, so may differ from some Ed25519 implementations in accepting or rejecting such signatures (just as some Ed25519 implementations may differ from each other).
The particular verification steps chosen by XEdDSA include rejecting s if it has excess bits but not requiring it to be fully reduced, and checking verification without cofactor multiplication. These choices align with existing Ed25519 code, and lead to simpler implementations.
The Curve448 elliptic curve specified in  can be used with XEdDSA and VXEdDSA, giving XEd448 and VXEd448. This curve defines the following parameters.
|p||2448 - 2224 - 1|
|q||2446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885|
|d||39082 / 39081 (mod p)|
The twisted Edwards curve equation is x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2. The u_to_y function implements the birational map from  by calculating y = (1 + u) * inv(1 - u) (mod p).
XEd448 differs from EdDSA  in choice of hash function. XEd448 uses SHA-512, whereas  recommends a 912-bit hash (912 = 2b). If the hash function is secure, outputs larger than 512 bits don't add security with Curve448, so XEd448 makes a simpler choice.
XEd448 may differ from other proposed instantiations of EdDSA  which use the "4-isogenous" curve from  rather than the "birationally equivalent" curve. Mapping from the Montgomery form Curve448 to the isogenous curve is more complicated.
7. Performance considerations
This section contains an incomplete list of performance considerations.
Faster signing: Calling calculate_key_pair for every XEdDSA signature roughly doubles signing time compared to EdDSA, since calculate_key_pair performs an additional scalar multiplication E = kB. VXEdDSA signing is more expensive, so the impact is proportionally less. To avoid this cost signers may cache the (non-secret) point E.
Pre-hashing: Except for XEdDSA verification, the signing and verification algorithms hash the input message twice. For large messages this could be expensive, and would require either large buffers or more complicated APIs.
To prevent this, APIs may wish to specify a maximum message size that all implementations must be capable of buffering. Protocol designers can specify "pre-hashing" of message fields to fit within this. Designers are encouraged to use pre-hashing selectively, so as to limit the potential impact from collision attacks (e.g. pre-hashing the attachments to a message but not the message header or body).
8. Security considerations
This section contains an incomplete list of security considerations.
Random secret inputs: XEdDSA and VXEdDSA signatures are randomized, they are not deterministic in the sense of  or . The caller must pass in a new secret and random 64 byte value each time the signing function is called.
Deterministic signatures are designed to prevent reuse of the same nonce r with different messages, as this reveals the private key a. Consider two XEdDSA signatures (R || s1) and (R || s2) such that:
s1 = r + h1a (mod q)
s2 = r + h2a (mod q)
The private key a can be calculated as a = (s1 - s2)/(h1 - h2) (mod q).
A deterministic signing scheme hashes M with a long-term secret to calculate r, instead of taking r from a random number generator. Because M is also hashed to calculate h the probability that different h get the same r is small. However, if the same message is signed repeatedly, a glitch that affects the calculation of h could cause this to happen (an observation due to Benedikt Schmidt). Also, repeated use of the same r might make it easier to recover information about r through side-channel analysis.
So XEdDSA and VXEdDSA preserve the idea of calculating r by hashing a long-term secret key and the message, but add a random value into the calculation for greater resilience.
Constant time. The signing algorithms must not perform different memory accesses or take different amounts of time depending on secret information. This is typically achieved by "constant time" implementations that execute a fixed sequence of instructions and memory accesses, regardless of secret keys or message contents.
Particular care should be taken with the calculate_key_pair function due to its use of conditional branching. The hash_to_point function also uses conditional branching (within elligator2) and should be made constant time, even though it only handles the message, not secret keys.
Key reuse: It is safe to use the same key pair to produce XEdDSA and VXEdDSA signatures.
In theory, under some circumstances it is safe to use a key pair to produce signatures and also use the same key pair within certain Diffie-Hellman based protocols . In practice this is a complicated topic requiring careful analysis, and is outside the scope of the current document.
This document is hereby placed in the public domain.
Special thanks to Mike Hamburg, creator of the Curve448 elliptic curve and Elligator 2, who was helpful in explaining them and in discussing several design questions.
Much thanks also to Moxie Marlinspike, David J. Wu, Robert Ransom, Peter Schwabe, Benedikt Schmidt, Samuel Neves, and Christian Winnerlein, all of whom contributed significantly to design discussions.
Thanks to Joseph Bonneau, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, and Tom Ritter for review and editorial feedback, and thanks to Joe for drawing our attention to the discrete-log VRF .
Thanks to Daniel Bernstein and Tanja Lange for suggesting the naming scheme, and for discussion.
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